Raghoobar v Legal Services Commissioner

Raghoobar v Legal Services Commissioner [2023] QCA 191
Supreme Court of Queensland
Bowskill CJ, Dalton JA, & Buss AJA
Legal profession – the Queensland Legal Services Commissioner brought proceedings against the appellant to restrain him from engaging in legal practice in Queensland when not being an Australian Legal Practitioner – the appellant denied that he was engaging in legal practice, and said that he was merely assisting people, some of whom he had known for a long time, in relation to legal matters – the primary judge made the restraint order sought, specifically providing that the appellant be restrained from (a) providing legal advice in relation to proceedings or potential proceedings, whether in person or in writing; (b) corresponding or communicating on behalf of parties to proceedings or potential parties to proceedings, or drafting correspondence or communications for parties or potential parties to proceedings to send themselves in relation to such proceedings; (c) drawing documents on behalf of, or as agent of, parties to proceedings or potential parties to proceedings; (d) drafting submissions, whether oral or written, for parties or potential parties to proceedings to present in court; (e) conferring with parties to proceedings in relation to those proceedings; and (f) attending at, or appearing in, court on behalf of parties to proceedings, including negotiating or mediating litigation matters on behalf of any party to proceedings – the appellant appealed – held: the appellant did not challenge the finding below as to what it means, as a matter of law, to “engage in legal practice”, namely, to carry on or exercise the profession of law, which includes doing things usually done by a legal practitioner, such as advising parties to litigation in respect of matters of law and procedure, assisting parties to litigation in the preparation of cases for litigation, drafting court documents or legal correspondence on behalf of parties to litigation and purporting to act as a party’s agent in relation to litigation – while the profession of law is to be distinguished from the “business” of law, indicia of carrying on a business are relevant to the assessment of the activities of a person in this context – a combination of the documentary material in evidence, including the invoices, and the answers given by the appellant in cross-examination, amply supported the conclusion reached by the primary judge, that the appellant had, on any view of the matter, engaged in legal practice – he had, on his own admission, (a) assisted with the creation of applications and affidavits; (b) drafted other documents for use in court; (c) advised parties to litigation in respect of matters of law and procedure and assisted them in the preparation of their cases for litigation; (d) drafted correspondence to be sent by the parties to their opponents in the litigation; and (e) charged clients for the work he had done – there was no reason why the appellant could not have been asked questions in cross-examination about invoices that were in evidence, without the actual file to which any particular invoice related being before the Court – the fact that the primary judge allegedly took notes during the respondent’s submissions abut not during the appellant’s submissions could not lead to the primary judge being disqualified for apprehended bias – how, when and to what extent a judicial officer makes notes in the course of a hearing is entirely a matter for that judicial officer, impossible for a person appearing by video-link (as the appellant did at the hearing) to properly comment on, and not relevant in any way to the determination of the appeal – appeal dismissed.
Raghoobar